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THE EXPLOSION IN THE LAW

With an Analysis of the Book, the Law Revolt,
by Melvin Belli
by
JUSTICE MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO*
I have just finished reading an absorbing work, The Law Revolt, by
Melvin Belli.1 In it Mr. Belli tells of the monumentally drastic changes
which have occurred in our substantive and procedural law during the
last half century or so. Any other author would probably have named a
similar work, Development in the Law, or The Evolution of Law, but
Melvin Belli, with an ever-youthful enthusiasm for all things appertaining to his dedicated profession, would never attach so staid a label to
any handiwork of his. And yet, this internationally famous lawyer, with
all the vividness of his personality, was really conservative in his naming
of what has recently happened in the legal universe.
There has been, during the last several decades, such an upheaval in
the law that one could, without hyperbole, call it an explosion. Indeed,
one who would contrast the law of 50 years ago, with that of today, not
in the meantime having marched with the pack of stare decisis on his
back, could believe that he was looking at the legal systems of two different civilizations and not of two eras separated only by a few years.
There have been legal doctrines so firmly imbedded in the granitic
mountain range of jurisprudence that even the Pyramids might seem
rolling pebbles in comparison. Yet, today, those doctrines are pulverized
sand on the shores of an ever-increasing appreciation of law as the handmaiden of justice and the companion of Humanity.
Let me offer an illustration. In 1910 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared that: "It is a doctrine too well established to be shaken,
and as unequivocally declared in our own state as in any other, that a
public charity cannot be made liable for the tort of its servants."' In
that case a nurse, employed by a hospital known as a charitable institution, placed on either side of a paying patient, still unconscious from
an administered anesthetic, hot water bottles which she had failed properly to cork. The escaping scalding water inflicted on the patient injuries
more serious than those she had entered the hospital to have mended.
She brought suit against the hospital organization and recovered a verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as above indicated, reversed the
verdict, stating that the charitable immunity doctrine could not be shaken.
* Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
1. M. BELLi, THE LAW REvoLT, (1968). Published by Trial Lawyers Service Co., Belleville, II1., 2 volumes, 1126 pp. $25.
2. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 258, 75 A.1087 (1910).
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In 1958, another paying patient, who was injured through negligence
in a so-called charitable institution, tried to shake the doctrine and again
our Court declared: "A rule of non-liability, even though judge-made,
that has become as firmly fixed in the law of this state as has the charitable immunity from tort liability, should not be abrogated otherwise
than by a statute."'
In 1961 the Court once more struck down an attempt to shake the
unshakable, and declared, with rising indignation, "It is to be hoped,
therefore, that with this current decision, the appellants' contention will
assume a state of quiescence so far as further insistent court action is
4
concerned."
But the contention did not remain quiescent. Like Phoenix it rose from
the ashes and in 1965, the charity doctrine was not only shaken but
tonplerl from ifc mrfrirmn ic nertal
on
n
h;T-Mi
i had1 stood too long
and the Court declared, what should have been obvious from the first
leaking hot water bottle that:
[I]f a hospital functions as a business institution, by charging
and receiving money for what it offers, it must be a business
establishment also in meeting obligations it incurs in running
that establishment.'
Another illustration: In 1913, George Bradley, with a purchased railroad ticket in hand, was waiting on the station platform when an iron
brake bar flew from a passing freight train and injured him. He brought
suit against the railroad company,6 but the trial judge directed a verdict
for the railroad. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of that day, with a single track naivet6 that is charming to
contemplate, said that the plaintiff could not possibly recover because
what had happened to him was an "accident pure and simple." What is
any negligence case but the result of an accident pure and simple?
Forty years later, a similar case came before our Court. A metal
coupler had detached from a passing train, and struck a truck traveling
on a road parallel to the railroad track. The truck owner recovered a
verdict, and the railroad company appealed. Its lawyer argued to us that
the verdict should be reversed, citing as its authority "the fair and reasonable rule set forth in the Bradley case." We rejected this whimsical
3. Knecht v. St. Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 78, 140 A.2d 30 (1958), Musmanno, J.
dissenting.
4. Michael v. Hahnemann, 404 Pa. 424, 426-27, 172 A.2d 769 (1961), Musmanno, J.
dissenting.
S. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 493, 208 A.2d 193 (1965), Musmanno,
J. writing the Majority Opinion.
6. Bradley v. L.S. & M.S. Rwy. Co., 238 Pa. 315, 86 A. 200 (1913).
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argument, stating that the Bradley decision,)vhich had "been doing service for 40 years, was due for formal retirement without pension."'
As recently as 15 years ago, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
handing down decisions which could only have caused law students embarrassment as they prepared for the practice of the law which is supposed to produce justice, regardless of unusuality of circumstance. On
January 15, 1951, A. W. Grotefend parked his automobile on private
property adjacent to Pennsylvania Railroad tracks. Several hours later
a tractor-trailer, like a meteor, came hissing through the air and landed
on Grotefend's automobile. The tractor-trailer had stalled at a railroad
crossing close by, but the engineer, heedless of the obvious barrier ahead
of him, refused to reduce the speed of his locomotive and turned the
tractor-trailer into a multiple-ton flying saucer which wholly demolished
Grotefend's private transportation system. Grotefend sued the railroad
company and won a jury verdict. Our Court reversed the verdict, stating
that the plaintiff had not proved any negligence. My dissenting opinion
endured for many pages, the final paragraph reading:
Because of his experience on January 31, 1951, A. W. Grotefend will undoubtedly never park an automobile in the vicinity
of a railroad track again, but from his experience with this lawsuit he will undoubtedly also feel that he should remain far
away from the courts because, from his point of view, a collision
with court-inspired law can be as devastating as a collision with
a railroad locomotive.'
The Grotefends of today need not remain away from the courts because, as Melvin Belli interestingly points out in his estimable two-volume
work, there has been a revolt in the law, and court decisions are currently
becoming more identifiable with that ingredient which, in the days of
common law pleading, was more or less a stranger in the courthouse, that
is, common sense. In 1956 the Bobbs-Merrill publishing house brought
out a book entitled Justice Musmanno Dissents, with an Introduction
by Roscoe Pound, Dean Emeritus of the Harvard Law School. It was a
compilation of the more important Dissenting Opinions I had written
in the five years I had been on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania up
to that time. In those five years I had written more dissenting opinions
than all the judges of the Supreme Court had collectively written in 50
years. Lawyers and law students have said that in reading the cases in
Justice Musmanno Dissents, and observing the current state of the law,
they have concluded that 65 % of the principles upheld in those dissenting
opinions are now contemporary law in the Commonwealth, either by court
decision or legislative action.
7. Mack v. Reading Co., 377 Pa. 135, 143, 41 A.2d 927 (1954).
8. Grotefend v. P.R. Co., 380 Pa. 439, 453, 110 A.2d 362 (1955).
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For decades it was a legal defense in an automobile collision case for
the defending motorist to say that the accident occurred because his car
skidded. In one case which came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court9
the plaintiff had been driving westwardly on the Pennsylvania turnpike.
Another car traveling eastbound in the eastbound lane skidded over the
medial line and struck the plaintiff's car head-on. The Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff could not recover because he could not say why
the car skidded, even though it was on the wrong side of the highway!
It was not until 1963 that our Court corrected this lopsided reasoning.
In writing the Majority Opinion which doomed the "skidding rule," I
said that the defendant in the case before us was of the impression
that once the word 'skidding' appears in the plaintiff's presentation of his cause, his case becomes an uncontrolled sled which
toboggans out of the courtroom unless he can show how, why,
when and where the skidding of the opposite party occurred.
The word 'skidding' has no such automatic self-destroying connotation in the jurisprudence of this Commonwealth. If it has,
it is repudiated here and now .

.

. When a motorist is on his

right side of the highway, obeying all the rules of the highway,
being careful, cautious and considerate of the rights of others,
and suddenly he sees coming toward him, like a gargantuan
genie, a destroying force, it is not for him to explain how and
why the invader got into his way.' 0
All of this, of course, is elementary, as Sherlock Holmes would say to
Dr. Watson, and yet who knows how many victims of skidding accidents
have had to limp through life on borrowed crutches because courts have
demanded an unrealistic quantum of proof? The law has skidded on
many highways other than ice-encrusted ones. And that is what Melvin
Belli's book, The Law Revolt, is about.
It is a fascinating work because each chapter has a happy ending, or
at least it offers encouragement to those who love the law and wish to
see it become in fact what it is supposed to be in theory, the embodiment
of reason.
Mr. Belli was perhaps the person best equipped to write a book of
this kind because he has "lived" the law keenly, passionately and devotedly. He is regarded as probably the most colorful practicing lawyer
at the American bar. He is also described as one of the most "controversial," although I cannot help wonder how a lawyer can be regarded
as other than controversial. A lawyer lives and thrives on controversy;
he is trained for controversy. As soon as he enters a law case, he imme9. Richardson v. Patterson, 368 Pa. 495, 84 A.2d 342 (1951).
10. Campbell v. Fiorot, 411 Pa. 157, 160-62, 191 A.2d 657 (1963).
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diately becomes the subject of conflict because there is already waiting
for him an opponent who, like a professional fencer, is prancingly eager
to lunge at him. Thus, whether a lawyer is naturally or not a belligerent,
he is bound to be a controversialist. Of course, Melvin Belli is a specific
kind of a controversialist because he has fought in so many battles and
has aroused so much contention that it is difficult to contemplate him,
like a prize fighter or gladiator, in any environment other than in a ring
or an arena.
His unique style, passionate partisanship, dynamic energies, novel
approach to legal situations and trial procedures inevitably provoke intense antagonisms which he returns in good measure, for his patrician
face is never red from having been slapped on both cheeks. We all
remember how, when he was handed that jolt in the Jack Ruby trial in
Dallas, he seized a microphone in the courtroom and broadcast to the
world the errors he believed had crowded the bench and invaded the jury
box. He did all this with choice adjectives and tonal thunder, and the
community rose in wrath against him. Bar associations, editors and
others condemned him for his unconventionalities and then, while the
smoke of bombardment still clouded the sky, he headed for the sophisticated cloisters of his elegant law offices in San Francisco, locked himself
in his library, and, with jurisprudential know-how, deep-water erudition
and analytic evaluation of facts, wrote out the 250-page appeal which
later won for Jack Ruby a new trial, even though in the meanwhile Belli
had been fired from the case by those he had most benefited at tremendous cost to himself.
This is one of the reasons why Melvin Belli is "colorful." He is a
triple-threat man: a resourceful and aggressive advocate, a profound
scholar, and a literary craftsman. Already he has written a score of books
and there is no law library which does not display his work on muchread shelves, and they have become much-thumbed text books in practically every law school.
If one desires to obtain a comprehensive view of the law as it is today,
without reading through the 105 encyclopedic volumes of Corpus Juris,
with all its pocket parts, I know of no book which depicts the current
landscape of the law in broad, vivid strokes as proficiently, interestingly
and attractively as The Law Revolt.
Mr. Belli says in the Introduction to his book that law is "where the
action is." This mirrors reality. The law is omnipresent even though it
may not assert itself until after the automobiles collide, the stocks crash,
the contract is written and then torn apart, the wills are prepared and
loving relatives don armor, and taxes are assessed and the sheriff appears.
There is no type of human relationship or of physical endeavor that cannot become so entangled that the courts finally have to be appealed to
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for the sword that severs the Gordian knot. Mr. Belli reminds us that
"In America, the American exclaims, when all else has failed, when other
redresses are unavailing, 'All right, then I'll go to court' "
What happens then when he gets into court? Those who have never
been to court still cherish the dream that the law is magic, and that its
wand will restore to the victim what has been unjustly taken from him,
and impose punishment on those who have stolen from the treasure box
of his constitutional rights. Disillusionment inevitably awaits the person
who reads the history of the law and glances into the star chamber proceedings of England, looks on trial by ordeal, and enters into the labyrinths of common law pleading. Belli tells of the agony of William Cullen
Bryant, one of America's stellar poets, who, beginning in his adult career
as a lawyer brought suit in libel in behalf of his client Bosey. At the
trial, the Judge entered judgment for Bryant's client. The defendant
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reversed the judgment
not because Bosey was not entitled to judgment but because Bryant had
made a mistake in his common law pleading. Said the Court: "The judgment must therefore be arrested (for improper pleadings). .

.

. In a

matter of technical law, the rule is of more consequence than the reason
for it; and however we may lament the lost labor and expense of the suit,
we find ourselves wholly unable to prevent it."" Could anything be more
unjust than the proposition that a rule is of more consequence than the
reason of it?
This arbitrary denial of justice and arrogant betrayal of reason was
eclipsed about a hundred years later by the same court (with different
members, of course) in the Sacco-Vanzetti case. After the men had been
convicted of robbery and murder, a certain Madeiros confessed to having
committed the crime. An impartial investigation followed and some fifty
persons verified the details of Madeiros' confession, which excluded Sacco
and Vanzetti from any participation in the South Braintree robbery and
murders. After denial of a new trial by the trial court, the defendants
appealed to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts which rejected the
appeal, laying down, with the rejection, one of the most incredibly inhuman doctrines ever spoken in a court of law, namely,
[I]t is not imperative that a new trial be granted even though
the evidence is newly discovered, and, if presented to a jury,
would justify a different verdict. The rule is the same even
though the case is capital.12
Later on, when I was a member of the Sacco-Vanzetti defense staff,
I filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
11. Bloss v. Tobey, 19 Mass. 320 (1824).
12. Comm. v. Sacco, 259 Mass. 128, 137, 156 N.E. 57 (1927).
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States. The callousness of the Massachusetts courts in refusing a new
trial, even though newly-discovered evidence could admittedly have
brought about an acquittal of the condemned men, was equalled by those
courts in refusing to grant a stay of execution, even knowing that our
case was awaiting hearing in the highest court of the land. And, in consequence, two innocent men went to their flaming death in the electric
chair.
One could also gasp in realizing that it was not until 1964 that Massachusetts eliminated prisoners' cages in the courtroom. Governor Endicott
Peabody sent to me the pen with which he signed the bill outlawing this
inhuman practice. He accorded me this honor because ever since the
execution of the "poor fish peddler and the good shoemaker," to which
the cage in which they were exhibited to the jury, together with perjured
testimony, district attorney falsities, and judicial tyranny, staggering to
behold, contributed to their immoral conviction, I had campaigned for
the elimination of this practice of the medieval ages.
In this regard, Melvin Belli bespeaks my sentiments when he says:
I've always felt that a lawyer should be heard in court and
out of court . . .that a lawyer should be a leader in the com-

munity, and particularly in community thought on controversial issues.
If my "colorfulness" has exceeded the bounds of propriety on
occasion it is only because I have felt that one had to ring the
bell to get the people into the temple.
I'd rather sit next to an honest man who wears a dinner jacket
with a red, white and blue striped necktie, in grossly bad taste,
than one in impeccable full dress who'd paid for his dinner with
counterfeit money!I 3
There has been much that has been counterfeit in the law, and it is
gratifying to read how Mr. Belli tells of the worm that turned, the sleeping giant who awakened and the pinioned civilian who broke his bonds
through the law, that is, through revolt in the law. For instance, when
an insurance company in a personal injuries case, harassed the plaintiff
by having private detectives trail him, by taking movies of him and
otherwise interfering with his enjoyment of normal life, Mr. Belli went
into court and obtained an injunction against this invasion of his client's
rights of privacy.
It used to be that most judges (and there are a few left) felt themselves guardians of the treasuries of defendants in civil cases. The gen13. M. BELLi, THE LAW

REVOLT,

344-45 (1968).
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eral impression abided that plaintiffs (especially in personal injury cases)
were in constant conspiracy to magnify their injuries, produce manufactured evidence and shed crocodile tears in order to achieve excessive
verdicts. The judges took it upon themselves to squeeze the tears out of
the verdicts and then cut the cloth of the verdict down to fit the frame
of their preconceived idea that the victim of an accident should not,
because of that fact, become rich.
It embarrasses me to recall the number of times my colleagues on the
Supreme Court applied pruning shears to snip in an area which I regarded
as non-snippable. In 1955 we had before us a case where the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $8,422.14 The plaintiff had
suffered a serious injury to his right knee cap which saddled him with a
15% permanent knee impediment. His doctor had testified that in running, the plaintiff's knee might "give out." The plaintiff testified that his
knee "feels like you have a real bad headache in your knee. You get a
thumping."
Although the plaintiff was only 24 years of age and, therefore, had a
life expectancy of 43 years, the majority of our court reduced the verdict
from $8,422 to $6,422. In my dissenting opinion I asked my colleagues
what type of diagnostic lenses they had in their judicial spectacles which
enabled them to say that $8,000 shocked their conscience and that $6,000
satisfied them to a microscopic satisfaction. I informed them further that
"[t]he swing of a knee hinge cannot be measured with such precise
monetary calipers that one can say with mathematical certitude where
the free arc ends which makes $8,000 shockable-but $6,000 just right."
In another case 15 the jury returned a verdict of $20,000. The trial court
reduced it to $14,000. Our Court, on appeal, cut the verdict down to
$8,000. I asked, in my dissenting opinion, how this Court could, "solely
from the cold, printed page, unwrinkled by the corrugations of pain that
the jury and the trial judge saw on the face of the victim . .. ,lop off
$6,000 . . ." The plaintiff was a railroad worker and his back had been

severely injured. I pointed out "that a back injury to a railroad worker,
who must move about in the turbulent arena of shifting locomotives,
drifting cars and falling missiles from overloaded gondolas, increases the
hazards of his work immeasurably. The perils of a railroad track are
legendary and the difference between safety and serious injury or death
is often the matter of a split second's physical movement."
My colleagues were not moved. The jury had awarded the plaintiff
$20,000, but when he finally left the shearing machinery of the courts,
14. Logue v. Potts Mfg., 381 Pa. 144, 112 A.2d 370 (1955).
15. Duff v. The Monongahela Connecting R.R. Co., 371 Pa. 361, 365, 369, 89 A.2d 804
(1952).
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he had $8,000. When he paid for his medical bills and attorney's fees,
he would have reason to wonder if the original verdict had not been
counterfeit money.
Melvin Belli was one of the pioneers in fighting for the acquisition and
retention, of adequate awards. He says in his book:
The procedure of demonstrative evidence-black boards,
skeletons, aerial photos, enlarged x-rays, models, experiments,
blow-up of transcript pages and records and reports, extended
opening statements (all of which I think I had some part in
initiating)-is a Revolution in the civil law.... The end result
of demonstrative evidence is the Adequate Award. But it is also
a more factual, a more just, a less confused, a more analyzed,
a more consonant end result of the trial with the compensation,
in dollars-modern dollars.'0
It is a strange thing that while appellate judges feel they have a duty
to reduce an excessive award, it does not occur to them that there might
be a corresponding duty to increase an inadequate award. In one of my
dissenting opinions 7 I pensively soliloquized:
If we can be shocked by an excessive verdict, why can we not
be shocked by an obviously inadequate verdict? If too much
causes a revulsion, why shouldn't too little awaken an equal
abhorrence? If we recoil from a verdict which is bloated, why
should we be indifferent to a verdict which is gaunt?
Why should an overfull larder shock our conscience more
than an empty or half-full one? Why should an extra loaf of
bread be more disturbing than a desiccated crust?
Melvin Belli devotes a section of his book to this interesting subject
and hopefully predicts that there will be a day when an additur will be
just as much normal procedure as a remittitur.
The issue of additur was not presented until modern times
but it is a logical step in the growth of the law relating to
unliquidated damages as remittitur was at an earlier date. Its
acceptance, though still somewhat retarded, is growing, noted
the California Supreme Court. The Court felt additur should
not be treated differently from 'other modern devices aimed at
making the relationship between judge and jury as to damages
as well as to other matters one that preserves the essential of
the right to jury trial without shackling modern procedure
through out-moded precedents. '18
16. M. BELLI, supra n.13, at 371.
17. Takac v. Bamford, 370 Pa. 389, 88 A.2d 86 (1952).
18. M. BELLI, supra n.13, at 424.
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How far should precedents control decisions? It would be a catastrophic mistake to assume that because precedents are from time to
time, overruled, that, we should not be guided by decisions based on the
wisdom of the past. Without stare decisis there would be no stability in
the law. The ship of the law should follow that well-defined channel
which, over the years, has been proved to be safe and trustworthy. But,
on the other hand, it would not comport with wisdom to say that when
shoals rise in a heretofore safe course, and rocks emerge to encumber the
passage, the ship should pursue the original course merely because it
presented no hazard in the years that have gone.
The doctrine of stare decisis does not demand that we follow precedents
which experience proves now violate accepted principles of justice.
A precedent hoary with age is not for that reason unauthoritative,
espeiall,, when the principle therein asserted has been re-affirmed over
the passing years. But when the old oaken bucket is replaced by a modern drinking fountain which responds to a pedal push, and quenches the
thirst of the drinker instantly and wholesomely, one does not insist on
creaking a crank to bring to the surface the moss-covered bucket of yore.
Melvin Belli points out that the revolution in the law which he describes has come about through due process:
Predictably and certainty (stare decisis and status quo) are not
absolute immutable terms. They are relevant and relative to the
changed social, economic and moral conditions of the times
during which they are applied. They are immutable but at the
same time must have a built-in commodity of growth to be
consonant with modernity, otherwise they wouldn't be compatible; they'd be an out of context compatibility. 9
There has been an explosion in the law, yes, but it is the kind of
explosion which in my boyhood days, as a coal miner's helper, I saw
miners employ in order to bring down a harvest of coal which, otherwise,
through the ordinary use of pick and shovel, would not have been accessible. Progress in the law must always be through due process. Mr. Belli
tells us:
And, at last, probably the most exemplary that there has been
a Revolt on the civil side in the common law is the pronouncement from the conservative House of Lords that 'stare decisis
has been abandoned as an instrument ratio decidendi.. 120
What this all amounts to is that so long as stare decisis is taking the
ship steadily across the ocean to its intended destination, it should not
19. Id. at 8.

20. Id. at 377.
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be thrown overboard. However, when magnetic universal forces affect
the reliability of the compass, adjustments are imperative. We recently
approved in our Court a verdict of $237,500 for a leg amputation. Commenting on this affirmance, Mr. Belli says:
Carefully dissecting defendant's many appellate complaints
most of which, before the Revolt, would have resulted in reversal . .. , Justice Musmanno concludes of and about defendant's complaints: 'This, of course, is to ignore fact for fancy,
positive evidence for guesswork, and demonstrated proof for
dialectic legerdemain. The jury and the court below rejected
this line of disputation and it finds no more concurring approval
here.' So, in The Civil Law Revolt, that is, also, where the now
action is-without ancient 'Dialectic legerdemain.' 2'
While an adequate award is not of itself the whole answer to the demand for justice in the civil courts, Mr. Belli queries if one can deny
the significance of money in modern day society?
Of course, social position and decorations even in a democracy may substitute for money. And some altruistic individuals
still live for service to other human beings alone, the goodness,
and if there is the necessity of self award, the satisfaction goodness by itself brings. But money in our society has become a
status of social position, of capacity, and indeed, of worth to
and in the community. This is not an unnatural result because
money was intended as a medium of exchange and expression
as a readily understood common denominator of one's worth.
So in the civil revolt, if there has been a revolt, it should be
particularly represented and reflected in the end result of the
civil law suit, damages, or quantum, or-money, the amount
22

paid.

The courts are realizing more than heretofore what it means to litigants
to get the money to which they lay claim. In reading the opinions of a
century or more ago-those long, polished, sapient opinions charming
with embroidered pedantry, one gets the impression that the money or
the house or the office the complaining party was seeking was merely an
annoying fish in the sea of academic philosophy in which the opinion
writer was floundering. It would never have occurred in those days for
a judge to absolve an insured from the obligations imposed on him by
fine illegible print in the policy. Courts more and more are looking for
the meat in the coconut unhampered by the hardness of the shell of
formalism. Mr. Belli finds:
21. Id. at 377.
22. Id. at 398.
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Courts now are increasingly finding the fine print, embodying
all types of waivers and disclaimers in insurance contracts, unfair to the insured or against public policy-if the print is too
23
fine to read, it becomes too fine for the law.
In one of my Opinions I said:
Diminutive type grossly disproportionate to that used in the
face body of a contract cannot be ignored; it has its place in
law ...

but where it is used as an ambush to conceal legalistic

spears to stab other rights agreed upon, it will receive rigorous
scrutinization by the courts for the ascertainment
of the true
2 4
meaning which may go beyond the literal import.
Another community liberated in the Law Revolt is the one made up
of victims of defective devices and contaminated beverages. For an indeterminate period in our law, the person who was made violently ill
by ingesting a fly in the baker's pie or drinking from a Coca-Cola bottle
in which reposed chewing tobacco could not obtain adequate redress in
the courts because it was practically impossible for him to prove that it
was the baker's negligence which allowed the fly to buzz into the custard
or the bottle manufacturer who allowed his quid to drop into the vat of
molten glass. The victim could bring an action, of course, but invariably
he could only get a couple of hundred dollars in settlement of what is
known as a "nuisance case."
The Law Revolt has changed this, because courts realize that ailments
resulting from the ingestion of defective drugs or contaminated food can
disable a person as grievously and as permanently as the injuries resulting from being run over by a truck. Now, one can proceed to trial against
the alleged offending manufacturer or tradesman not only on the basis
of negligence but on the basis of warranty. Belli's law firm has been in
25
the forefront in the warranty revolt. In the case of Escola v. Coca-Cola
where he represented the plaintiff, the Court held:
The civil disability under the statute attaches without proof
of fault, so that the manufacturer is under the duty of ascertaining whether an article manufactured by him is safe.
Belli states the situation clearly in his book by asking: "What is the
real problem, negligence v. warranty, what is its practical thrust?"
He answers the question:
A defective or unwholesome commodity is put into the stream
of commerce. If plaintiff, the consumer, sues in negligence, he
23. Id. at 444.
24. Cutler v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 7, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
25. 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944).
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must show that the commodity was negligently fabricated. But
plaintiff cannot go into defendant's factory, in most cases, to
prove this. (Legally now he can, but practically it would cost
him too much money, too many experts and too much discovery.) He wants to come up with some sort of a practical "res
ipsa loquitur" (in function and result warranty and res ipsa
loquitur sometimes coalesce). The consumer or user of a deleterious or unwholesome or improperly fabricated product wants
to show that it is just that, that he has been proximately damaged by the product, then rest. Warranty permits him so to
do-and what's more, his damages in doing this are now higher
than in suing in negligence, for, in warranty, with rare exceptions defendant can't show
how "careful" he was "to make the
' 26
jury feel sorry for him.

Some ten years ago in the famous Sal Cutter poliomyelitis case Belli
recovered a verdict of $675,000. The defendant did not appeal the verdict and, later, on the basis of this pilot case, the defendant settled other
pending cases against it by paying $2,000,000.27

Although Pennsylvania is sometimes regarded as overly conservative
in adopting needed reforms in the law, it pleases me that our Supreme
Court has taken, I believe, the lead in rejecting the presumptuous argument that the defendant in a given case was not responsible for the
plaintiff's injuries because the alleged tort was "an act of God." In March,
1958, Bowman's back was broken when a telephone pole, whose wires
were heavily laden with snow, fell on him. In the ensuing lawsuit against
the telephone company, charging negligence in failing to inspect the pole,
the company stated it was not liable because the fall of the pole was
an
28
act of God. We rejected the defense. I wrote the Majority Opinion:
It cannot be asserted that it was the hand of God which
pushed over pole No. 16 to break Bowman's back. Snow fell, as
it falls every winter in the temperate zone, and provident people
anticipate this type of atmospheric precipitation by taking
necessary precautions against its inflicting excessive damage....
[I]t is not enough in order to escape responsibility, for the
owner of an instrumentality which inflicts damage, to assert that
the instrumentality was propelled by the Supreme Beiig and
that, therefore, he can shake the clinging snow of responsibility
...off

his hands.

26. M. BELLI, supra n.13, at 562.
27. TnE VERDICTs WERE JUST (A. Auerbach & C. Price, ed. 1966) 194.
28. Bowman v. Columbia Telephone Co. 406 Pa. 455, 179 A.2d 197 (1962).
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Man in his finite mind cannot pass upon the wisdom of the
Infinite. There is something shocking in attributing any tragedy
or holocaust to God ... The defendant in [this] case knew that

pole No. 16 carried 28 wires and that [they] formed a grill
which would receive and hold on to snow, especially if it was
wet. It thus became a question of fact for the jury to determine
whether the company could anticipate what should be the
strength of the pole to sustain the total weight of the snow.
There is one pocket, however, in the Law Revolt, which still holds out
against the forces of imperative correction, and that is, what Mr. Belli,
calls "No impact torts." In April, 1950, eight cows invaded the farmland
of Mrs. Bosley, destroying gardens and trees. They brought along with
them their boy friend, a 1500 pound Hereford white-faced bull. When
Mrs. Bosley saw the bull she screamed and the bull chased her. In her
fright she stumbled and fell and the bull came within inches of goring
her, when he was driven away. Because of the fright and exertion in
running, Mrs. Bosley sustained a serious heart attack. She brought suit
against the owner of the bull. She was non-suited and our Court affirmed
on the basis that there had been no physical29 contact between the bull and
the plaintiff. I dissented, saying, inter alia:
[I] f one can die with laughing, perish with weeping and freeze
from fear, how can it be said that there is no tie of contact between the terror of immediate death caused by the charging of a
ferocious beast and a heart ailment which contemporaneously
occurs and thereafter unceasingly continues?
The nervous system is peculiarly susceptible to non-tangible
excitation, and it is not to be denied that the wrecking of nerve
ganglia can often be more disabling than the breaking of bones
or the tearing of flesh. And where it is definitively established
that such injury and suffering were proximately caused by an
act of negligence, why should the tortfeasor not be liable in
damages?
The hopeless, almost ludicrous, inconsistency in the law on this subject
is that the owner of a horse may recover for a physical ailment suffered
by his horse resulting from fright, but a human being may not sustain an
action for injuries resulting from the same kind of fright.
[I] f evidence may be submitted to prove the deterioration of a
horse caused by a fright, why may not evidence be accepted
with regard to disability sustained by a human being as the
29. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 187, 190, 194, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
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result of extraordinary terror due to the fault of another? And if
it be said that a horse dismayed by an automobile will from then
on be afraid of automobiles, can it not also be said that, very
likely, Mrs. Bosley will from now on be afraid of bulls?
I ended my rather lengthy dissent in this fashion:
In recapitulation I wish to go on record that the policy of
non-liability announced by the Majority in this type of case is
insupportable in law, logic, and elementary justice--and I shall
continue to dissent from it until the cows come home. 0
It will be seen from this case, and many others, of course, that the Law
Revolt has by no means reached its fullest development. There are several areas in the law where further revolt is required. I have dissented
in a number of cases on the subject of governmental immunity. To me it
is nothing less than outrageous that in a democracy where every person,
firm and organization is liable for its torts, the government, which is
supposed to symbolize the ultimate in legal, as well as moral responsibility, should be immune from liability for the negligence of its servants,
agents and employees.
Another sector on the battlefield where reinforcements are needed to
break through enemy opposition is the one imprisoning rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment. Stephen Girard, by his will written in
1830, founded a college restricted to "white orphans." The college, because of public supervision, public inspection and the expenditure of
public funds, has in effect become a public institution and, thus, under
the 14th amendment, may not bar applicants on the basis of race. The
Pennsylvania courts still refuse to recognize this fundamental proposition.
In one of its decisions, the Majority Opinion of our Court declared that
"'a man's prejudices are a part of his liberty." In my dissenting opinion,
I observed:
The Majority Opinion quotes over and over the line which is
slightly revolting to me that a man's prejudices are part of his
liberty ... I would say that a prejudiced person may have the
right to hurt himself through the indulgence of his prejudices,
but he has no right to affect the liberty of others. 1
Still another sector in the law revolt, where additional push is required
is that one which prohibits actions in tort between members of the same
30. Prosser and Smith, in their book on Torts quoted from my dissenting opinion in this
case and then added in a footnote: "The balance of the dissenting opinion of Justice Musmanno, which runs to a great many pages, is well worth reading, if only as an unusual
piece of literature, and a spectacular diatribe of a disgusted judge." PRossER & SarH, CASES
ON TORTS, 453 (3d ed. 1962).
31. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 639, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).
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family on the basis that such litigation might disrupt the peace of the
family. Yet the law allows intrafamilial assumpsit suits where more ill
will can be engendered than in a lawsuit between, for instance, parent and
child where, because of insurance coverage, there cannot possibly be any
real animosity.
But let us rejoice that the revolt is on. Rome was not built in a day,
nor can all the legal rubble of the centuries be swept away in a generation.
The steam shovels of common sense and the bulldozers seeking a keener
appreciation of humanity are working, and let me humbly suggest that
we continue to work to make true what I said in one case:32
As much as the lay world may assume that law consists of a
game in the abracadabra of words, and as much as that assumption may have been true in Shakespearean days, it is reassuring
to note that the law of today aims at realities and the achievement of a justice which will appeal to the reason of the most
unlettered man on the street. Law is simply justice in action
(emphasis added).
32. Jeannette Glass Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 409, 88 A.2d 407 (1952).

